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NOTE
ANTITRUST RULEMAKING AS A SOLUTION TO ABUSE
OF THE STANDARD-SETTING PROCESS
Adam Speegle*
While many recognize the critical role that technology plays in modem
life, few appreciatethe role that standardsplay in contributing to its success. Devices as prevalent as the modern laptop computer for example,
may be governed by over 500 interoperabilitystandards, regulatingeverything from the USB drive to the memory chip. To facilitateadoption of such
standards,firms are increasinglyturning to standard-settingorganizations.
These organizations consist of members of an industry who agree to abide
by the organization'sbylaws, which typically regard topics such as patent
disclosure and reasonable licensing. Problems arise, however when members violate these bylaws after a standard has been adopted. Where a
member asserts its patents against other members in violation of the organization's bylaws, that member engages in what is known as "patent
holdup." Both private and public litigation have focused on curbing this
practice, but the current regime remains imperfect. This Note argues that
the best approach to the current problem of patent holdup requires the
Federal Trade Commission to promulgate an antitrust rule. This approach
combines the advantages associatedwith traditionalenforcement with the
beneficial aspects of agency rulemaking.
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INTRODUCTION

Some technological advancements provide benefits by themselves.
However, the vast majority of devices available to the consumer are in reality aggregations of independent patented technologies that are packaged
together and that rely on interoperability standards to function.' The personal computer is a prominent example of this concept.2 Personal computers
combine various technologies, such as DVD drives, USB outlets, and
memory chips, which each rely on interoperability among products to be
fully functional. If there were twenty different standards for DVDs that required twenty different players, consumers would experience dramatically
fewer benefits. Thus, it is important that industry settle on standards for interoperability among products.
There are two primary ways in which an industry can settle on a standard: through the regular course of competition, which often gives rise to
"standard wars," or through standard-setting organizations ("SSOs"l).3
Standard wars, such as the recent Blu-ray/HD DVD conflict and its predecessor the VHS/Betamax conflict, rely on the marketplace to decide which
standard prevails.4 This process can be long, and it leads consumers either to
purchase the losing standard or wait for the market to decide on a standard.5
To avoid these problems, industries can convene SSOs.6 SSOs are groups
composed of members of a certain industry, such as the memory chip indusI. See Christopher Hardee, Single-Firm Opportunism and the FTC's Rambus Defeat:
Implicationsfor Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 18 TEx. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 97, 98-99 (2009).
2. It is estimated that over 500 different interoperability standards are required to
produce a typical laptop computer. Brad Biddle et al., How Many Standards in a Laptop?
(And Other Empirical Questions), PROc. 2010 ITU-T KALEIDOSCOPE ACAD. CONF. 123, 125,
availableat http://www.itu.int/dms-pub/itu-t/opb/procTf-PROC-KALEI-2010-PDF-E.pdf.
3. See Patrick D. Curran, Comment, Standard-Setting Organizations:Patents, Price
Fixing, and Per Se Legality, 70 U. CHm. L. REV. 983, 988-92 (2003).
4. See S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Should Technology Choice Be a Concern of Antitrust Policy?, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 283, 290-95, 314-16 (1996); David J. Teece
& Edward F. Sherry, Standards Setting and Antitrust, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1913, 1915 (2003);
Curran, supra note 3, at 989 n.26.
5. See Hardee, supra note 1, at 99; Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 4, at 293-94.
6. See Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1889, 1896-98 (2002) (discussing the need for standard-setting in the
face of complex technology demands).
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try, who meet to decide on industry standards.7 Because the members set
standards as a group, consumers benefit from interoperability among their
products and are not forced to decide which standard to adopt.8 Further, industry benefits from increased and accelerated consumer adoption of its
standard 9
While SSOs provide many benefits to consumers and industry, some
members of SSOs have devised ways to abuse the standard-setting process
in order to extract greater returns. Through a practice known as "patent
holdup," patent holders of a technology that will become a standard wait
until their technology has been adopted by the SSO, and then "hold up" the
manufacturing process by charging higher royalties to extract greater profits
from the manufacturers." Patent holdup harms consumers not only by increasing the price of technology" but also by delaying the standard-setting
process and erasing the efficiency gains that attract industry to SSOs in the
2
first place.1
In order to combat these abusive practices, both the government and private parties have brought actions against SSO members who use patent
holdup tactics, but the current state of the law has failed to establish sufficient disincentives to prevent these tactics for good. Reliance on private
parties and the Sherman Act has proven ill suited for this new wave of anticompetitive practice. In response, the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC" or
"the Commission") has invoked section 5 ("Section 5") of the Federal Trade
Commission Act ("FTCA"), which declares unlawful "[u]nfair methods of
competition," to combat these abuses. 3 This approach, while somewhat ef-

fective, remains an incomplete solution due to concerns arising from the
expansion of the provision's application to a point at which it begins to harm
industry participants and elicit judicial and congressional backlash.' 4 There
is, however, an alternative approach. By adopting a rule under the "unfair
methods of competition" prong of the FTCA, the FTC can benefit from the
7.
8.

Id. at 1892-93.
See Hardee, supra note 1, at 98-99, 99 n.6.

9.

See id.

10.

Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 310 (3d Cir. 2007); see also

Bruce H. Kobayashi & Joshua D. Wright, Federalism,Substantive Preemption, and Limits on
Antitrust: An Application to Patent Holdup, 5 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 469, 489 (2009)

(discussing cases where deception was used to extract royalties through patent holdup).
11. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEx.
L. REV. 1991, 2011-17 (2007) (explaining through modeling that patent holdup results in
higher prices and lower output).
12. See id. at 2016 (explaining how injunctions or threats of injunctions hold up manufacture of products relying on a standard).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006).
14. See Workshop on Section 5 of the FTC Act as a Competition Statute 4-20 (Oct. 17,
2008) [hereinafter Section 5 Workshop], available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/workshops/
section5/transcript.pdf (opening remarks of William Kovacic, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm'n)
(explaining reluctance on the part of the Commission to bring actions under an independent
Section 5).
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independence and flexibility of Section 5, give greater notice to industry of
what practices will be unlawful, and assure the courts that this new application of Section 5 will not lead to limitless expansion of the provision.
This Note argues that the FTC should use its antitrust rulemaking authority to promulgate a rule that declares it a violation of Section 5 of the
FTCA for firms to engage in deception and other anticompetitive conduct in
abuse of the standard-setting process. Part I explains the problem of patent
holdup and reveals how reliance on private action and the Sherman Act's
monopolization provision is insufficient to combat it. This insufficiency is
due to inherent limitations in the antitrust statute and contract law. Part II
discusses the benefits and drawbacks of an "independent"'' 5 Section 5 in the
standard-setting context and argues that Section 5, while an improvement
over Sherman Act and contract litigation, still presents an incomplete solution to patent holdup. Finally, Part III advocates promulgation of an antitrust
rule by the FTC that draws on the benefits of Section 5 while providing
clear boundaries that should alleviate industries' and courts' major concerns.
I.

CHALLENGING PATENT HOLDUP IN

STANDARD-SETTING ORGANIZATIONS

The problem of patent holdup cannot be solved by reliance on SSOs,
private actions, or the Sherman Act. Section L.A looks at the abuses that
have developed to take advantage of the standard-setting process and explains how these abuses result in anticompetitive consequences that require
legal action. Section I.B surveys the efforts that SSOs and private parties
take to combat these abuses and explains how these efforts face inherent
limitations that make reliance on them insufficient. Section I.C examines the
Sherman Act's application in the standard-setting context and discusses how
limitations both in the underlying statute and in legal precedent make the
Sherman Act a tool ill suited to combating abuse in SSOs.
A. The Problem of Patent Holdup
SSOs are groups, often composed of competitors within an industry, that
meet over a period of time to develop an industry standard. 16 During the
standard-setting process, the group evaluates members' contributions (pa-

15. "Independent" Section 5 refers to the FrC's use of this provision without reference
to the Sherman Act. As discussed infra in Section ILA, the FTC may not directly enforce the
Sherman Act, but rather must use Section 5 of the FTCA with a reference to the Sherman Act.
Where the FTC desires to use Section 5 beyond the limits of the Sherman Act, it invokes Sec-

tion 5 without reference. This is known as an enforcement action under an independent
Section 5. See Daniel A. Crane, Reflections on Section 5 of the FTC Act and the FTC's Case
Against Intel, 2010 COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L ANTITRUST
Reflections on Section 5].
16. Lemley, supra note 6, at 1892-93.

CHRON.

1, 3-5 [hereinafter Crane,
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tented technologies) on their technical and practical merits. 7 SSOs may8
adopt either an "open" or a "closed" standard as a result of this process.'
Open standards are those that "are not controlled by any one party and can
be adopted freely by all market participants."' 9 Closed standards involve one
or more specific patented technologies that require royalty licensing.20 In
choosing whether to adopt an open or closed standard, the SSO may weigh
the competing interests and incentives of members to decide on a standard
that meets the needs of the industry and that manufacturers feel confident
integrating into their products. 21
This process, however, has a major flaw. While it is capable of producing a number of procompetitive results, it is also open to abuse by its
members through patent holdup, which may have a detrimental impact on
competition and consumers. Patent holdup may take a variety of forms and
may affect both open and closed standards. 22 For example, a member of an
SSO may fail to disclose its patent during the standard-setting process and
may either remain silent or encourage the group to adopt its technology as a
standard without the other members knowing the implications of their decision. Once the SSO adopts the technology and expends a substantial amount
of time and money integrating the standard into new and existing products,
the patent holder may make known its ownership of the patent and bring
patent infringement actions against users of the standard.23 On the opposite
end of the spectrum, a patent holder may make its patents known to the SSO
and promise licensing at a nominal rate. Once the patent is integrated into
the final standard, however, the patent holder may use its newly obtained24
market power to extract substantial royalties from the other members.
While these are just two examples of possibilities for abuse, there are countless variations on the general principle that they represent: patent holders
can easily abuse the standard-setting process for their own gain.

17. Joseph Scott Miller, Standard Setting, Patents, and Access Lock-In: RAND Licensing and the Theory of the Firm, 40 IND. L. REv. 351, 365 (2007).
18. Lemley, supra note 6, at 1901-02.
19. Curran, supra note 3, at 990; see also Lemley, supra note 6, at 1902.
20. See Lemley, supra note 6, at 1901-02.
21.
See id.
22. See Robert A. Skitol & Kenneth M. Vorrasi, Patent Holdup in Standards Development: Life After Rambus v. FTC, ANTITRUST, Summer 2009, at 26, 28 (discussing how recent
precedent permits scenarios where patent holdup may occur in both the "open" and "closed"
standard context); see also Section 5 Workshop, supra note 14, at 240-43 (remarks of Robert
A. Skitol, Partner, Drinker, Biddle & Reath LLP) (offering a series of hypothetical scenarios
giving rise to patent holdup).
23. See, e.g., Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456, 460-61 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (discussing
the lag between standard adoption and patent disclosure).
24. See, e.g., Negotiated Data Solutions LLC, File No. 051-0094, 2008 WL 258308, at
*5 para. 37(a) (F.T.C. Jan. 22, 2008) (charging that the defendant anticompetitively increased

its royalty rates).
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Patent holdup is harmful for a variety of reasons. First, patent holdup delays the implementation of a standard.25 One of the reasons for forming an
SSO is to accelerate the adoption of new standards; 26 so, in delaying the
process, patent holdup directly undercuts the aim of the entire system. Second, by taking advantage of their enhanced market position, patent holders
also harm competition by reducing output, increasing costs to manufacturers, and excluding manufacturers. 2' Each of these methods is likely to result
in increased costs to consumers.2 8 Third, patent holdup discourages participation in SSOs and harms innovation. 29 Where the danger of abuse
undermines the collaborative process by threatening to extract supracompetitive prices from competitors, industry members are less likely to participate
in SSOs in the future and, as a result, consumers are less likely to benefit
from these organizations.30 And fourth, the costs of patent holdup inflicted
on industry members, both in litigation and in royalty payments, draw funding away from research and development and, in extreme cases, may drive
some companies out of business.3' Given the harmful consequences patent
holdup may have on consumers and the marketplace as a whole, the question quickly turns to what can be done to stop it.
B. Deficiencies in PrivateAction

While there is a range of legal options available to private parties injured
by patent holdup, sounding in areas from contract to tort law, private action
alone cannot provide a complete solution to the problem.32 One reason for
this is the way SSOs operate. Through their bylaws, SSOs ensure that each
member agrees to a series of requirements in order to take part in the standard-setting process. 3 3 These requirements typically include agreements to

disclose patents and to license these patents on reasonable and nondiscriminatory ("RAND") terms. 34 However, the terms of these agreements are
25. See Gil Ohana et al., Disclosure and Negotiation of Licensing Terms Priorto Adoption of Industry Standards: Preventing Another Patent Ambush?, 24 EUR. COMPETITION L.
REV. 644, 644-45 (2003).
26. Cf Teece & Sherry, supra note 4, at 1914-17 (discussing benefits of adoption of a
standard in the context of the alternative "standards war").
27.

See generally Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 11, at 2010-17 (discussing the harm to

victims of patent holdup).
28. See id. at 2013.
29. Id. at 1993.
30. Id.; see Section 5 Workshop, supra note 14, at 228-31 (remarks of Scott Peterson,
Senior Counsel, Hewlett-Packard Co.).
31. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 11, at 1992-94.
32. See generally Lemley, supra note 6, at 1909-37 (discussing legal avenues available
to private parties and the failings of this enforcement mechanism).
33. Id. at 1904.
34. See id. at 1902--04, 1973 (providing a survey of SSO agreements); Mark A. Lemley,
Ten Things To Do About Patent Holdup of Standards (And One Not To), 48 B.C. L. REV. 149,
156 (2007).
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intentionally left vague to avoid potential antitrust liability. If the terms of
the SSO agreement are too specific-for example, listing pricing requirements for patented technologies-they could be viewed as illegal

price-fixing agreements.35 As a result, SSO bylaws often provide at most a
questionable foundation on which to base litigation over patent licensing
36

disagreements.

Moreover, many firms-particularly third-party beneficiaries-are unable to pursue action through traditional legal routes. In the SSO context,
third-party beneficiaries are industry members who have chosen not to participate in the SSO. Once the SSO selects a standard, these firms are still
exposed to both the benefits of the standard-setting process and the problems
that arise from patent holdup. But while members of the SSO may have weak
claims against a firm engaged in patent holdup, third-party beneficiaries
were not even parties to the SSO agreement. They are therefore even more

unlikely to bring any successful suit in instances of patent holdup.37
Even assuming that SSO members are willing and able to engage in litigation with a firm attempting patent holdup, consumer welfare takes a
backseat to the members' financial considerations.3 8 Because the incentives

of the SSO members do not align with those of consumers, enforcement
actions by firms in the private sector cannot be relied on to adequately protect consumers. 39 This concept is illustrated by a practice known as

injunction threats, in which a patent holder threatens to bring an injunction
against a manufacturer for violating its patent unless the manufacturer pays a
substantial royalty.4 ° While the patent holder's threat may have questionable
35. Michael G. Cowie & Joseph P. Lavelle, Patents Covering Industry Standards: The
Risks to Enforceability Due to Conduct Before Standard-Setting Organizations, 30 AIPLA

Q.J. 95, 102 (2002) ("SSOs have been reluctant to specify or become involved in setting royalty rates for patented technology for fear that they will be accused of price fixing or another
violation of the antitrust laws."); Amy A. Marasco & Elizabeth Dodson, Invention and Innovation: Protecting Intellectual Property in Standard-Setting, 2 INT'L J. IT STANDARDS &
STANDARDIZATtON RES. 49, 50 (2004).

36. See Cowie & Lavelle, supra note 35, at 144-45 (discussing a case in which the
court found SSO bylaws too vague to support defendant's claims); see also Lemley, supra
note 6, at 1964-67 (describing problems that arise from using an SSO term like "reasonableness" to defend against patent holdup).
37. See Lemley, supra note 6, at 1915-17 (explaining the limitations on third-party
beneficiary claims against parties who engage in patent holdup); see also Request for Investigation of Rembrandt, Inc. for Anticompetitive Conduct That Threatens Digital Television
Conversion from Albert A. Foer, President, Am. Antitrust Inst., to Donald Clark, Sec'y, Fed.
Trade Comm'n (Mar. 26, 2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/aai.pdf (requesting FTC
action, in communication by third-party beneficiary, where firm repudiated RAND commitment to third party by claiming that actions related to an SSO did not create a contractual or
other right as to third-party beneficiaries).
38. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 11, at 2008-17 (describing litigation-settlement
decision by firms based on internal cost considerations).
39. See Section 5 Workshop, supra note 14, at 262-63 (remarks of Michael Lindsay,
Partner, Dorsey & Whitney LLP) (discussing the incentives of manufacturers when faced with
patent holdup).
40. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 11, at 1992-94.
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legal footing, the manufacturer will often pay the royalty instead of engaging
in extended litigation.4 This happens for several reasons. First, the manufacturer has a disincentive to engage a patent holder in litigation because the
manufacturer will bear the cost of the litigation, the result of which could
benefit competitors. 42 Companies will tend to pay the royalty and wait for
another company to challenge the practice. 43 Second, the costs associated
with challenging injunction threats may be substantial." On top of ordinary
litigation costs, if the manufacturer has already begun making and distributing goods based on the patented technology, a potential preliminary
injunction could have a devastating effect on its business.4 5 While engaging
a patent holder in litigation may collaterally benefit consumers in that increased royalties are not passed through to the price of the ultimate product,
this benefit does not tip the scales in favor of manufacturers pursuing such a
path.' Thus, reliance on litigation by SSO members or other third parties
will not provide a complete solution to patent holdup, as these parties serve
as poor proxies for consumers.
C. Deficiencies in the Sherman Act
There are, however, other legal avenues that do take account of
consumers' interests. The Sherman Act was adopted in 1890 in reaction to
the power and wealth increasingly aggregated in large trusts.47 The Act
consists of two primary provisions: section 1 ("Section 1"), which prohibits
combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade,48 and section 2 ("Section
2"), which prohibits monopolization of any part of trade or commerce. 49 In
practice, Section 2 of the Sherman Act prevents anticompetitive and
exclusionary conduct by single competitors, and thus is most applicable to
the single-firm conduct at issue in the standard-setting context.50 But
application of this section is also subject to shortcomings.

41. See Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules Govern
Information?, 85 TEx. L. REV. 783, 786-88 (2007).
42. Section 5 Workshop, supra note 14, at 262-63 (remarks of Michael Lindsay, Partner, Dorsey & Whitney LLP).
43. Id.
44. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 11, at 2009; Lemley & Weiser, supra note 41, at
786-87; Section 5 Workshop, supra note 14, at 266-67 (remarks of Robert A. Skitol, Partner,
Drinker, Biddle & Reath LLP).
45. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 11, at 1992-93.
46. See id. at 1994-2010 (explaining that production concerns associated with an injunction drive firms to settle questionable infringement suits).
47. See David Millon, The Sherman Act and the Balance of Power, 61 S.
1219, 1220-21 (1988).
48. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
49.

CAL.

L. REV.

Id. § 2.
50. See Gregory J. Werden, Competition, Consumer Welfare, & the Sherman Act, 9
SEDONA CONF. J. 87, 89-90 (2008).
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Section 2 was instituted to prevent abuses of monopoly power, but abusive conduct in SSOs does not always fit neatly within monopolization
theory.51 Monopolization theory depends on conduct constituting "the willful acquisition or maintenance" of monopoly power "as distinguished from
growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business
acumen, or historical accident."52 It is difficult to apply this standard to the
standard-setting context because the requisite traditional form of conduct,
measured by whether a company has unlawfully acquired or maintained
monopoly power (e.g., driving rivals out of business followed by monopoly
pricing), is not present in that context.53 SSOs involve collaboration among
competitors; it is the collaborative efforts of the group that elevate the patent
54
holder's patent to a level at which abuse of monopoly power may occur.
Because this collaboration is what grants the patent holder its power, abusive conduct in SSOs does not fit as neatly within Section 2 as traditional
monopolization cases, and may as a result
be substantially harder to contest
55
in litigation under the antitrust statute.
Not only do the Sherman Act's underlying statutory provisions make its
use in the standard-setting context difficult, but judicial decisions have established Sherman Act precedent that requires increasingly more stringent
tests, thereby making litigation under the Act an undesirable option.56 This
strict approach to the Sherman Act adopted by the courts is primarily due to
the profound impact Section 2 cases have as precedent.57 First, violations of
the Sherman Act can carry substantial consequences. Those who violate the
Act are subject to potential criminal penalties.5 8 Also, where a court has
found that a company has harmed competitors, that company is subject to
treble damages (three times the amount of monetary harm inflicted on competitors). 9 Further, private actors may bring allegations of Sherman Act

51.
Herbert Hovenkamp, The Federal Trade Commission and the Sherman Act, 62 FLA.
L. REv. 871, 874 (2010).
52. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
53. Hardee, supra note 1, at 106-07 (explaining the problems of using Section 2 to
combat standard-setting abuse and discussing how, even though it has been employed in cases
such as Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456 (D.C. Cir. 2008), the statute lacks firm case law
supporting its use against many forms of patent holdup).
54. Section 5 Workshop, supra note 14, at 228-31 (remarks of Scott Peterson, Senior
Counsel, Hewlett-Packard Co.).
55. See id.; Hardee, supra note 1,at 107-O8 (2009).
56. See Crane, Reflections on Section 5, supra note 15, at 3-5; see also Section 5 Workshop, supra note 14, at 72-80 (remarks of Daniel A. Crane, Professor, Benjamin N. Cardozo
Sch. of Law).
57. See Crane, Reflections on Section 5, supra note 15, at 3-5.
58.
15 U.S.C. § 3 (2006) (establishing violation of the Sherman Act as a felony punishable by imprisonment and financial penalties); id. § 6 (allowing for forfeitures of property in
transit); id. § 8 (establishing violations of the Sherman Act related to importation of goods as
misdemeanor offenses).
59. Id. § 15 ("[Any person who shall be injured in his business or property ...shall
recover threefold the damages by him sustained.").
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violations, magnifying the implications of judicial decisions.6" Because of
the impact these decisions could have on future cases, courts have increasingly sought to limit the Sherman Act's application by imposing more
difficult standards on Sherman Act plaintiffs.61
One prominent example of the difficulty of bringing cases under the Act
is Rambus, Inc. v. FTC.62 As explained in greater detail in Part 11,63 Rambus
involved an SSO organized to adopt a standard for memory chips.' 4 During
the standard-setting process, Rambus failed to fully disclose its patents to
the organization. 65 After the group adopted a standard, based in part on patented technology owned by Rambus, Rambus brought royalty actions
against memory chip manufacturers. 66 The FTC brought suit against Rambus under a monopolization theory based on Section 2 of the Sherman Act,
arguing that, but for Rambus's failure to disclose its patent, the SSO would
not have adopted its patent as its standard and Rambus would not have obtained its market power.67 However, because the FTC was unable to prove
with adequate certainty that Rambus's patent would not have been adopted
had it properly disclosed its patents, the FTC failed to meet the Sherman
68
Act's causation requirement, and judgment was returned for Rambus.
With these weaknesses in the structure of the Sherman Act itself, and
with the baggage it carries from recent precedent, the Act is not the ideal
option for pursuing abuses in SSOs. Pursuing recourse through private action similarly fails to remedy the situation due to underlying deficiencies in
courses of action available to the private sector. 69 A better solution to the
problem must involve government action to take account of losses in general
consumer welfare. However, that government action needs to be brought
under a statute that is both flexible and unburdened by the baggage that
comes with the Sherman Act. Section 5 of the FTCA satisfies both of these
elements.

60. Section 5 Workshop, supra note 14, at 254-55 (remarks of Jonathan Leibowitz,
Comrnm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n).
61.
62.

Id. at211.
522 F.3d 456 (D.C. Cir. 2008).

63. See infra Section II.C.
64. Specifically, the complaint pertained to Rambus's conduct regarding dynamic random access memory ("DRAM") technology. Complaint 1, Rambus Inc., File No. 011-0017,
Docket No. 9302, 2002 WL 1436415 (F.T.C. June 18, 2002) [hereinafter Rambus Complaint].
65.

Id.

l[54-55.

66. Id. 145.
67. Rambus, 522 F.3d at 462-67 ("In this case under § 5 of the FTC Act, the Commission expressly limited its theory of liability to Rambus's unlawful monopolization of four
markets in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act ....Therefore, we apply principles of antitrust
law developed under the Sherman Act... .
68.
69.

Id. at 463-64.
See supra Section I.B.
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EMPLOYING SECTION

5

IN THE STANDARD-SETTING CONTEXT

Bringing suit under Section 5 of the FTCA solves many of the problems
associated with private action and reliance on the Sherman Act, but it remains an incomplete solution to patent holdup. Section II.A of this Note
establishes, through statute and precedent, the flexibility and independence
of Section 5. Section II.B argues that those qualities remedy many of the
deficiencies of enforcement in private actions and Sherman Act suits.

Section II.C tracks the FTC's Section 5 enforcement actions in the standardsetting context, which demonstrate the benefits of enforcement under the

section. Finally, Section II.D, drawing on these actions, contends that reservations related to the flexibility of Section 5 on the part of the Commission,
the courts, and industry mean that reliance on enforcement actions brought

under this provision is at best an incomplete solution.
A. The Scope of Section 5
The text and legislative history of Section 5 of the FTCA support the

view that the provision would be a flexible tool to combat anticompetitive
abuses, though subsequent judicial decisions have sometimes challenged the
extent of the FTC's authority under the Act. The FTC was established in
1914 as an independent expert agency in the field of antitrust law with au-

thority deriving from its enabling statute, the FTCA.7 ° Section 5 of the
FUCA, in vague terms, declares unlawful "[u]nfair methods of competition
...and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce."'"
When Congress passed the FTCA, it deliberately left these terms broad and
undefined.7 2 At the time, antitrust enforcement was within the jurisdiction of

the Department of Justice under the Sherman Act.73 The Sherman Act, while
an effective litigation tool against practices that fell clearly within Sections 1
and 2, was not as effective against other anticompetitive practices.7 4 Congress
created the FTC to enforce Section 5 as a more flexible standard, prohibiting

incipient violations.75 In this way, Section 5 was not just coextensive with the

70. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2006); see Marc Winerman,
The Origins of the FTC: Concentration, Cooperation, Control, and Competition, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 2, 75, 90-92 (2003) (describing the founding of the FTC).
71.
Federal Trade Commission Act § 5(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1).
72. S. REP. No. 63-597, at 13 (1914) ("[T]here were too many unfair practices to define, and after writing 20 of them into law it would be quite possible to invent others."); Neil
W. Averitt, The Meaning of "Unfair Methods of Competition" in Section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act, 21 B.C. L. REv. 227, 228 (1980).
73. Averitt, supra note 72, at 230.
74. S. REP. No. 62-1326, at 12 (1913) ("[A]s the statute is now construed there are ...
many other practices that seriously interfere with competition, and are plainly opposed to the
public welfare, concerning which it is impossible to predict with any certainty whether they
will be held to be due or undue restraints of trade.").
75. FTC v. Motion Picture Adver. Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 394-95 (1953) (It is
clear that the Federal Trade Commission Act was designed to supplement and bolster the
Sherman Act and the Clayton Act-to stop in their incipiency acts and practices which, when
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Sherman Act6 but expanded the federal antitrust regime beyond the Sherman
7

Act's reach.

While the FTC appeared to have authority to bring action against any
method of competition it deemed "unfair," in the Commission's early years
it remained uncertain whether Section 5 mirrored Sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act or whether it could be employed to reach actions beyond the
scope of the Act. This uncertainty was resolved in a series of Supreme Court
decisions supporting a flexible interpretation of Section 5 independent of the
Act.77 In 1966, the Court in FTC v. Brown Shoe Co.7" explained that the
FTC, under Section 5, "arrest[s] trade restraints in their incipiency," and that
this power "is particularly well established with regard to trade practices

which conflict with the basic policies of the Sherman and Clayton Acts even
though such practices may not actually violate these laws." This point was
again stressed in the Court's 1972 decision in FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson
Co.79 and in its 1986 decision in FTC v. Indiana Federationof Dentists,8 ° in
which the Court noted that Section 5 also covers "practices that the Com-

mission determines are against public policy" in the antitrust context,
grounds for action beyond those associated with the Sherman Act.
While the above cases demonstrate that the FTC has very broad authority in the antitrust arena, several appellate courts, particularly in Official
Airline Guides, Inc. v. FTC,81 Boise Cascade Corp. v. FTC,82 and E.L du
Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC,83 have suggested that this authority has lim-

its. In the 1970s, the FTC brought these cases to expand the independent
role of Section 5 in the antitrust context. But these efforts failed, and the
resulting decisions continue to affect how the Commission approaches Section 5 cases. 4 While the decisions recognized that Section 5 allows the FTC
to challenge behavior beyond the reach of the Sherman Act, they pushed
full blown, would violate those Acts, as well as to condemn as 'unfair methods of competition' existing violations of them." (citations omitted)); Averitt, supra note 72, at 242.
76. See FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 (1972).
77. E.g., Motion PictureAdver, 344 U.S. at 394-95 ("The 'unfair methods of competition' which are condemned by Section 5(a) of the Act, are not confined to those that were
illegal at common law or that were condemned by the Sherman Act."); see also Section 5
Workshop, supra note 14, at 64 (remarks of Robert Pitofsky, Sheehy Professor of Trade Regulation, Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr).
78.

384 U.S. 316, 321-22 (1966).

79.

405 U.S. at 242.

80. 476 U.S. 447,454 (1986).
81. 630 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1980) (rejecting FTC's claim that a publisher of an airline
schedule violated Section 5 by refusing to publish schedules for smaller airlines).
82. 637 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1980) (rejecting FTC's application of Section 5 against an
independent parallel adoption of delivered pricing systems).
83. 729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1984) (rejecting FTC's claim that the use of most favored
nation clauses by two major suppliers was a violation of Section 5 because it facilitated parallel pricing).
84. See, e.g., Complaint at *25-27, Negotiated Data Solutions LLC, File No. 051-0094,
2008 WL 258308 (ET.C. Jan. 22, 2008) [hereinafter Negotiated Data Complaint] (Majoras,
Comm'r, dissenting).
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back on the FTC's interpretation of unfair conduct-a severe blow to the
FTC's power. 85 Moreover, these decisions coincided with the Reagan Administration's minimalist approach to antitrust enforcement that limited FTC
actions, cut FTC staff nearly in half, and statutorily restricted the FTC's jurisdiction. 86 This series of events has in many ways left the Commission
shell-shocked, and serves as an ongoing roadblock to expanding Section 5.8"
B. Section 5 Remedies Deficiencies in the
CurrentEnforcement Regime

Section 5 is an important tool in fighting SSO abuse because it remedies
several deficiencies apparent in a regime that otherwise depends on private
action or Sherman Act enforcement. First, Section 5 provides an indirect
remedy for SSO members and third-party beneficiaries. Under the current
regime, third-party beneficiaries-firms that benefit from the standardsetting process but are not themselves members of the SSO--do not have as
strong a cause of action as SSO members.88 And even members' claims are
weak, because the SSO agreements establish obligations so vague that they
may not be sufficient bases for action.89 Under an enforcement regime employing Section 5, however, the FTC could bring actions against SSO
members who have abused the standard-setting process through patent
holdup. This regime would not provide a new private cause of action, because only the FTC may enforce Section 5.90 But it would allow the FTC to
bring actions that might not otherwise be brought and to seek injunctive relief against firms engaged in patent holdup.9 1 If not a complete solution to
the problems faced by private parties, a regime under Section 5 could at
least still solve many of those parties' concerns.
Second, unlike private litigation, enforcement actions under Section 5
would recognize consumer welfare considerations. In bringing these actions,
the FTC considers the harm suffered by the firm but focuses primarily on

85. William E. Kovacic & Marc Winerman, Competition Policy and the Application of
Section 5 of the FederalTrade Commission Act, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 929, 942 (2010) ("In each
instance, the court found that the Commission had failed to make a compelling case for condemning the conduct in question.").
86. William E. Kovacic, The Modern Evolution of U.S. Competition Policy Enforcement
Norms, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 377, 384-86 (2003). See generally William E. Kovacic, Public
Choice and the Public Interest: Federal Trade Commission Antitrust Enforcement During the
Reagan Administration, 33 ANTITRUST BULL. 467 (1988) (discussing the shift in FTC enforcement priorities brought about by the Reagan Administration).
87. Crane, Reflections on Section 5, supra note 15, at 3-4; see also Section 5 Workshop, supra note 14, at 4-20 (remarks of William Kovacic, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comn'n).
88.
89.
90.
1973).
91.

See supra Section I.B.
See supra Section I.B.
See, e.g., Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 988, 997 (D.C. Cir.
See infra Section II.C.
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broader consumer welfare concerns associated with patent holdup. 92 This
accords with the widely held view that the purpose of antitrust law-and
thus antitrust enforcement actions-is to improve consumer welfare and
prevent commercial activities that may harm consumers.93 Because the FTC
has an interest in maximizing consumer welfare, an enforcement regime
under Section 5 offers benefits to consumers that alternative regimes cannot.
Finally, an enforcement regime under Section 5 would not be subject to
the baggage carried by the Sherman Act. While private litigation has cabined the legal force of the Sherman Act, courts have not treated the FTCA in
the same way.94 The FTC faces no heightened legal burdens in asserting a

scope of Section 5 that goes beyond the bounds of the Sherman Act-in
fact, Supreme Court precedent supports such a construction. 95 Section 5
suits are thus more likely to succeed and to yield benefits to both consumers
and industry.
C. A History of FTC Actions in the Standard-SettingContext

Through four major cases, the FTC has attempted to combat abuse of
the standard-setting process. Together, these cases demonstrate that, while
the FTC's current approach has been somewhat successful, it still remains
an incomplete solution to the problem of patent holdup.
The FTC's first case against an SSO member for abuse of the standardsetting process was Dell Computer Corp.96 In 1992, Dell became a member
of the Video Electronics Standard Association ("VESA"), an SSO composed
of virtually all major U.S. computer hardware and software manufacturers,
and soon began actively participating in VESA's efforts to establish a standard
for a computer bus design. 97 Once the group settled on a standard, Dell certi-98
fied in writing that the standard did not infringe on any of its patents.
However, one year prior to the agreement, Dell had patented a technology that
had been incorporated into the new standard, and after the bus design moved
into widespread use, Dell announced to manufacturers that the design infringed on its patent and demanded appropriate compensation.99 The FTC
found that Dell had engaged in an unfair method of competition through
patent holdup and entered an order preventing Dell from enforcing its patent.'00 A majority of the Commission stressed the importance of Section 5
92. See, e.g., Dell Computer Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616, 626 (1996); see also Hovenkamp,
supra note 51, at 878-79.
93. See, e.g., Dell, 121 F.T.C. at 626; see also Thomas F. Cotter, PatentHoldup, Patent
Remedies, andAntitrust Responses, 34 J. CORP. L. 1151, 1199 (2009).
94.

See Crane, Reflections on Section 5, supra note 15, at 3-5.

95. See supra Section II.A.
96. 121 F.T.C. 616.
97. Id. at 617. A computer bus is a component of a computer that carries information
internally. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at617-18.
100. Id. at 618-22.
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actions where consumer harm is likely, alluding to the fact that private parties fail to take consumers' interests into account in bringing actions in those
situations.1"' The majority also added that, unlike other antitrust statutes,
of case, in which the legal
Section 5 "is particularly appropriate in this 10type
2
and economic theories are somewhat novel."'
Next, in 2003, the FTC brought a complaint against Union Oil Co.
("Unocal"). 10 3 The FTC alleged that the company had engaged in an unfair
method of competition in violation of Section 5 by inducing the California
Air Resources Board ("CARB") to adopt Unocal's patented technology2 °4
CARB is a state body empowered to conduct standard-setting proceedings
related to low-emission gasoline standards.'0° Unocal actively participated in
certain CARB proceedings and, according to the complaint, made misrepresentations and engaged in other bad faith and deceptive conduct, creating
the impression that it did not possess or would not enforce any relevant intellectual property rights. 0 6 It was only after refineries had spent billions of
dollars adopting the resulting standard that Unocal commenced patent enforcement efforts. 07 In 2005, Unocal agreed to a consent order commanding
it not to enforce these patents as a condition of its proposed merger with
Chevron. 108
In 2002, the FTC issued a complaint against Rambus, Inc. alleging, inter
alia, that the company had engaged in a pattern of anticompetitive acts and
practices over the preceding decade to monopolize a segment of the memory
chip market, and that this conduct constituted an unfair method of competition under Section 5 of the FTCA. °9 Rambus's scheme arose from its
participation in the Joint Electron Devices Engineering Council ("JEDEC"),
an SSO convened to develop a memory chip standard.I" Rambus had several patents that involved specific technologies proposed for, and ultimately
adopted in, this standard."' In violation of JEDEC's bylaws, Rambus had
concealed these patents through bad faith and deceptive conduct. 112 Once
JEDEC's standard became widely adopted by the memory chip industry,
Rambus began enforcing its patents, holding up the production process in

101.

Id. at 626.

102.
103.
2003 WL
104.
105.

Id.
Complaint I1-2, Union Oil Co. of Cal., File No. 011-0214, Docket No. 9305,
1190102 (F.T.C. Mar. 4, 2003).
Id.
Id. 11.

106.
107.
108.
2005).
109.

Id.
1-3.
Id. [[5-6.
Union Oil Co. of Cal., Docket No. 9305, 2005 WL 2003365, at *3 (F.T.C. Aug. 2,

110.
111.
112.

Rambus Complaint, supra note 64,
Id. 2.
Id.
Id.

1.
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order to extract payments from manufacturers. 1 3 Rambus lost its case before the FTC, but appealed that decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit. In its argument before the D.C. Circuit, the FTC dropped its
independent Section 5 claim and instead relied solely on a monopolization
theory based on Section 2 of the Sherman Act. 1 4 Because Sherman Act
precedent had established a strict causation standard, the FTC115was unable to
meet its burden, and the court entered judgment for Rambus.
Finally, in 2008, the FTC issued a complaint against Negotiated Data
Solutions LLC ("N-Data") alleging that the company had violated Section 5
by engaging both in unfair methods of competition and in unfair acts and
practices, a separate prong of Section 5 that focuses more on consumer protection.11 6 These alleged violations arose from N-Data's conduct related to
the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers ("IEEE"), an SSO involved in developing a computer networking standard.117 Whereas the FTC's
prior actions in the SSO context had been brought against firms for failing to
disclose patents, this case involved N-Data's failure to license its patents on
terms it had promised prior to the standard's adoption. 18 Not long after the
complaint was issued, N-Data and the FTC entered into a consent agreement
whereby N-Data agreed to cease enforcement of the relevant patents.'1 19
These cases demonstrate a few important points. Most encouragingly,
they show that the FTC is committed to bringing enforcement actions
against standard-setting abuse and willing to aggressively pursue such abuse
using novel theories, such as the introduction of the consumer protection
prong of Section 5 in N-Data.' z Less encouragingly, they also highlight the
shortcomings of Section 5 enforcement.
One such shortcoming is the reluctance of some members of the FTC to
expand the use of Section 5, which may undercut its effectiveness as a litigation tool. In some cases, this reluctance only appeared in the form of
dissents. In Dell, for example, Commissioner Azcuenaga objected to the
Commission's decision because the FFC's application of the statute seemed
to lack clearly defined limits, potentially resulting in a "chilling effect" on

113. Id. 2.
114. Rambus Inc. v. FrC, 522 F.3d 456, 467 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (describing the FrC's shift
from Section 5 in the original complaint to a theory based entirely on the Sherman Act).
115.
116.

Id. at 462-67; see also supra notes 62-68 and accompanying text.
Negotiated Data Complaint, supra note 84, [ 1, at *1.

117. Id.
118. Id. In 26-32, at *4-5. A different company had originally offered the contested
royalty, but the claim carried to N-Data as successor to that company. Id. [ 12-13, at *2; id.
23-24, at *4.
119. Negotiated Data Solutions LLC, File No. 051-0094, Docket No. C-4234, 2008 WL
4407246, at *6-22 (ET.C. Sept. 22, 2008).
120. Negotiated Data Complaint, supra note 84, 1, at *1; see also Robert P. Taylor,
Standard Setting: Where Are We After Rambus and N-Data, in 15TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 167, 176-79 (Practising Law Inst. ed. 2009) (noting the ag-

gressive shift in enforcement against SSO abuse highlighted in the N-Data case).
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participation in SSOs. 12 1 Chairman Majoras and Commissioner Kovacic
echoed these concerns more recently in N-Data.12 2 In Rambus, however,
reluctance on the part of the FTC to rely on a novel use of Section 5 over a
more traditional Sherman Act argument in the appellate court likely compromised the case itself.1 23 The level of apprehension exhibited by the
Commission in employing Section 5 in these cases is unlikely to diminish.
Because of its potential to undermine future enforcement actions against
patent holdup, this issue remains a serious concern.
Another issue that undermines the FTC's record of success in past Section 5 enforcement actions is the legitimacy of these actions. Dell, Unocal,
and N-Data were resolved through settlement or adjudicative proceedings
before the Commission, 124 and in Rambus, the FTC failed to present its Section 5 argument to the D.C. Circuit. Whether the provision may legitimately
be used against patent holdup thus remains unresolved by an Article III
court. This legitimacy issue stems from the concern that, while the Commission is ostensibly independent, it may be biased in favor of actions brought
by the FTC.1 25 For Section 5 to reliably combat patent holdup, the FTC
would need to test its application through the appellate process in a federal
126

court.

D. Remaining Problems with Section 5 Enforcement
Issues of legitimacy and the commissioners' trepidation in the FTC's
record of actions against standard-setting abuse suggest that an enforcement
regime under Section 5 may not be the best solution to patent holdup. There
are, however, other considerations outside of that record that tip the scales in
favor of seeking an alternative means of combating patent holdup.
While Section 5's flexibility is beneficial in its gap-filling role, it also
presents a problem. Whether a firm's conduct is "unfair" within the meaning
of Section 5 is a subjective assessment on the part of the FTC. As such, industry is not always given sufficient notice of which actions are appropriate
and which actions may result in antitrust scrutiny. Specifically, there is some
fear that application of Section 5 to patent holdup may have a chilling effect
121.
senting).

Dell Computer Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616, 634-38 (1996) (Azcuenaga, Comm'r, dis-

122. Negotiated Data Complaint, supra note 84, at *23 (Kovacic, Comm'r, dissenting);
id. at *27 (Majoras, Comm'r, dissenting).
123. See Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456, 467 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (noting the shift in the
FTC's argument from Section 5 to the Sherman Act); see also supra text accompanying notes
109-115.
124. The FTC is a body of five commissioners appointed by the president. 15 U.S.C.
§ 41 (2006). The commissioners, in addition to voting to initiate enforcement actions and to
take other agency action, may also serve as a panel in adjudicative proceedings on appeal from
an administrative law judge. FTC decisions are appealable to a federal court of appeals. 16
C.F.R. pt. 3 (2010).

125. Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons
from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 894-95 (2009).
126.

See Kovacic & Winerman, supra note 85, at 941-42.
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on SSO participation. 127 Much of the benefit of the SSO system derives from
wide participation of industry members at many levels. This participatory
process can produce procompetitive results that encourage innovation and
benefit consumers through lower prices and efficient standard setting. In
approaching potentially anticompetitive conduct by a firm, the FTC's use
of Section 5 is generally bound by self-imposed limitations. 128 However, as
N-Data illustrates, the FTC's perception of these limits, at least in the
standard-setting context, is evolving. Where industry participants perceive
an increased potential for liability arising from membership in SSOs, participation in SSOs will likely decline. And even where firms continue to
participate, the process may grow to be so overcome by burdensome procedural safeguards as to eliminate many of the core benefits of collaborative
standard setting that gave rise to the process to begin with. As the FTC continues to expand its use of Section 5 against patent holdup, concerns about
the chilling effect that these actions may have on the standard-setting process become more salient and raise serious questions about the appropriate
role of Section 5.
Another major concern with bringing cases under an independent Section 5 is that, as the application of the provision expands and the bounds of
its flexibility are tested, the FTC risks eventual backlash from the courts or
Congress similar to the backlash it experienced in the 1980s. 12 9 The FTC
relies on Section 5 in both antitrust and consumer protection actions. A negative holding on Section 5's use in the standard-setting context may not only
bear on future patent holdup enforcement efforts but may also severely impede the FTC's efforts in other areas. If the FTC fails to limit the application
of Section 5, it risks subjecting Section 5 to the same or more severe judicial
and congressional treatment than it experienced in the past. 30 Additionally,
many states have their own statutes that are modeled after the FTCA. These
state statutes are interdependent with the federal FTCA, and state courts
interpret them using federal FFCA precedent. 13' Because holdings related to
the FTCA at the federal level can, for better or for worse, impact these state
statutes, unfavorable Section 5 precedent could also undermine actions at
the state level.
The Commission's recognition of these risks may also pose a challenge
to effective enforcement under Section 5 if fear of collateral effects chills
enforcement actions that are genuinely warranted. The memory of the
Commission's experience with Section 5 expansion from the 1970s and

127. See Dell Computer Corp., 121 ET.C. 616, 634-38 (1996) (Azcuenaga, Comm'r,
dissenting).
128. Negotiated Data Complaint, supra note 84, at *25-26 (Majoras, Comm'r, dissenting); see also supra text accompanying notes 81-87.
129.
130.

See supra notes 81-90 and accompanying text; see also infra note 145.
See supra text accompanying notes 81-87; see also infra note 145.

131. See Negotiated Data Complaint, supra note 84, at *23-24 (Kovacic, Comm'r, dissenting).
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1980s still lingers in the minds of commissioners and FTC staff, 132 and fears
of collateral consequences continue to weigh on the FTC's actions today.133
Thus, as new forms of anticompetitive conduct emerge, the FTC's reliance
on Section 5 enforcement may be a poor legal avenue not only because of
the potential backlash from Section 5 expansion but also because of the risk
of inaction arising from the fear of potential collateral consequences.

III. ANTITRUST

RULEMAKING AS A SOLUTION TO PATENT HOLDUP

By using its antitrust rulemaking authority, the FTC can rely on many of
the benefits associated with Section 5 while avoiding the issue of unbounded
authority that has evoked reservations on the part of industry, the courts, and
members of the Commission. Section I.A explains the authority of the FTC
to conduct antitrust rulemaking and argues that, while almost never used, such
authority still remains a viable option open to the Commission. Section HI.B
discusses characteristics that an antitrust rule relevant to standard-setting
abuse should have. Section III.C looks to potential concerns regarding enforcement by rule and balances those concerns against the benefits associated
with adopting such a rule to remedy deficiencies in the standard-setting process.
A. Authorityfor Antitrust Rulemaking
Rulemaking is an attractive and sometimes necessary way in which administrative agencies carry out their responsibilities. Rulemaking authority
is delegated to administrative agencies by statute, which establishes the
bounds of that authority. 3 4 After an agency promulgates a rule according to
procedures established under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"),' 35
the rule becomes effective and the agency may, if the rule so specifies, enforce it in federal court. 36 Rules may also receive Chevron deference, a
doctrine by which a court will defer to reasonable agency interpretations of
ambiguous statutes that the agency administers.' 37

132. See supra Section II.C.
133. See, e.g., Negotiated Data Complaint, supra note 84, at *23-24 (Kovacic, Comm'r,
dissenting) ("The Commission overlooks how the proposed settlement could affect the application of state statutes that are modeled on the FrC Act... ),
134. Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporatingthe Administrative Process,
98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 106-11 (1998).
135.
136.

5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006).
See id. § 554. See generally Croley, supra note 134, at 106-11 (describing the

rulemaking process).
137. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45
(1984) (holding that courts should defer to an agency's reasonable interpretation when traditional methods of statutory interpretation render an ambiguous meaning); see also Thomas W.
Merrill & Kristen E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 833 (2001) (discussing
Chevron deference).
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Under section 6(g) of the FTCA, the FTC is authorized to promulgate
rules with respect to "unfair methods of competition."138 These rules have
the force of law. 139 While the FTC has authority under this section to conduct antitrust rulemaking, it has almost never exercised it. The FFC has
promulgated only one rule under this authority, and that rule was repealed
after decades of disuse. 140 The FTC has considered other opportunities to
promulgate antitrust rules, but none of those other efforts have ultimately
produced a final rule.' Antitrust rulemaking in the standard-setting context
may provide an excellent opportunity 1to
revive this antitrust tool and fill a
42
gap in the current enforcement regime.
B. Form of a ProposedRule

An antitrust rule might take any of a number of forms in order to effectively remedy the patent holdup problem. At one end of the spectrum, the
FTC could promulgate a rule articulating specific licensing requirements.
This could include not only specific disclosure obligations but also RAND
or other pricing requirements. However, such a high degree of top-down
control would place an impractical burden on the government and limit the
flexibility that must be afforded to SSOs in crafting bylaws.' 43 At the other
end of the spectrum, the FTC could promulgate a rule in vague terms that
mimic the ambiguities of Section 5. While this would allow for flexible enforcement, it would also give rise to serious concerns, including the
argument that such a rule would undercut many of the advantages of the
rulemaking process, such as effective notice to industry. A solution somewhere between these two points on the spectrum would likely yield the best
results.

138. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006); see also FED. TRADE
COMM'N, OPERATING MANUAL ch. 7, § .4, at 33 (2003) [hereinafter FTC OPERATING MANUAL], available at http://www.ftc.gov/foia/ch07rulemaking.pdf
("[T]he Commission has
statutory authority under FTCA § 6(g) to promulgate rules respecting unfair methods of competition.").
139. Nat'l Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 698 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding that the FTCA conferred broad powers on the FTC to make substantive rules and
regulations); see also C. Scott Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust: Using New
Data and Rulemaking To PreserveDrug Competition, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 677 (2009).
140. See Discriminatory Practices in Men's and Boys' Tailored Clothing Industry, 59
Fed. Reg. 8527 (Feb. 23, 1994) (codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 412) (repealing the previous rule
governing promotional allowances in the mens' and boys' tailored clothing industry); Discriminatory Practices in Men's and Boys' Tailored Clothing Industry, 58 Fed. Reg. 35,907
(proposed July 2, 1993) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 412) (issuing a notice of proposed

rulemaking seeking comments on whether to repeal the rule).
141. See, e.g., FTC Staff Narrows Rulemaking Possibilities to Three Areas, Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 884, at A-13 (Oct. 12, 1978) (noting potential antitrust rulemak-

ing opportunities considered by FTC staff).
142.

See infra Section III.C.1 for a more detailed discussion of the reasons behind the

infrequent use of antitrust rulemaking.
143.

See infra notes 148-151 and accompanying text.
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An ideal rule would balance a preference for affording SSOs flexibility
in setting internal rules-avoiding excessive top-down control-with the
need for a rule specific enough to provide adequate notice to industry. This
Note proposes one such formulation: a rule that declares failure of an original or successive patent holder to abide by an SSO rule or practice with
respect to a member's patents or patent applications, or to adhere to any
formal or informal commitment to the SSO with respect to the terms under
which members may license its patents, to be an unfair method of competition within the meaning of Section 5. While this is a concise formulation, it
contains several key elements that combat patent holdup.
First, the proposed rule is based on the "unfair methods of competition"
prong of the FTCA. It is true that the consumer protection-focused "unfair
acts and practices" prong of the Act might also be applicable in the SSO
context, as demonstrated by its recent use in N-Data.1" However, the procedural hurdles placed on that approach, more stringent than traditional APA
procedures, make it a far less practical approach to take. 145 Unlike these
burdensome procedures, antitrust rulemaking under the "unfair methods of
competition" prong need follow only general APA rulemaking procedures.146 As a result, potential rulemaking establishing an act as an "unfair
method of competition" is a far more prudent approach.
Next, the proposed rule would ensure that the obligations it places on
members of SSOs follow the underlying patents, so that the sale of a critical
patent would not remove the rule's protections. This is an important element
because of the FTC's lesson in N-Data: there, a licensing commitment was
made by one company, but a successor company refused to honor it, insisting that it was not bound to license on the initial patent holder's promised
terms. 147 By attaching obligations to the patent and not to the patent holder,
fears of successor companies abandoning commitments on which SSO
members rely in choosing a standard would diminish.
The proposed rule would also buttress SSOs' rules, rather than marking
a shift to top-down government regulation of the standard-setting process. A
top-down model would not only strip SSOs of their flexibility but would
also require the government to shoulder the impossible task of setting SSO
bylaws and licensing terms amenable across commercial sectors. Flexibility
is critical for SSOs, which often arise in industries undergoing rapid technological change. Moreover, even where SSOs operate within the same general
sector, each SSO is typically formed to address specific technologies that

144.
145.
TRUST

Negotiated Data Complaint, supra note 84,
1-2, 38.
See Marc Winerman, The FTC at Ninety: History Through Headlines, 72

ANTI-

L.J. 871, 890 (2005); see also H.R. REP. No. 11-367, pt. 1, at 104 (2009) ("Congress

instituted the Magnuson-Moss rulemaking procedures in the 1970s due to its growing concern
that the FTC, which at the time was carrying out multiple wide-ranging concurrent rulemakings, should be required to carry out more structured rulemaking procedures").
146. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006); see also FTC OPERATING MANUAL, supra note 138, § .4
(discussing procedures for rulemaking under the unfair competition powers in Section 5).
147.

See supra notes 116-119 and accompanying text.
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require distinct solutions. 48 One size does not fit all. 49 Disclosure obligations that an SSO deems appropriate, for example, may vary depending on
both the technology and external considerations, such as potential participants' reluctance to join the SSO due to overly burdensome disclosure
rules. 150 Some standards may require royalty-free licensing; SSOs convened to set others may prefer RAND licensing, or set no specific
licensing obligations for its members at all.' 5' In such a complex climate,
it is nearly impossible for the government to act as a top-down rulemaking
and rate-setting organization, because it is hardly capable of analyzing
industry conditions and establishing rules that will effectively promote
rather than chill innovation in all cases.
Finally, the proposed rule would still be specific enough to provide some
notice to industry. A major problem with traditional enforcement under Section 5 is that, because the provision is so flexible, market participants do not
know whether their activities will be subject to FTC action. This creates a
degree of unease that can have a chilling effect on innovation. The proposed
formulation of this rule states that violations occur where members fail to
adhere to commitments made to the SSO, or to SSO rules or practices related to patents or patent applications. While perhaps not an ideal solution
from the perspective of patent holders, this text would provide clear notice
that violating explicit SSO rules or procedures as to patents, or failing to
adhere to other SSO-mandated commitments, would be construed as an unfair method of competition. It would similarly act as a default rule for SSOs
and their members. SSOs, aware that antitrust authorities will only buttress
existing rules rather than broaden them with expansive Section 5 enforcement, would renew their focus on articulating member obligations with
sufficient clarity to merit protection as an "SSO rule or practice" within the
meaning of the proposed rule. SSOs would also craft bylaws that make it
clear that, in agreeing to them, members are making a "commitment" to the
SSO within the meaning of the proposed rule.'52 Members, for their part,
would likely show greater interest in ensuring that they are correctly interpreting obligations imposed on them by the SSO. This is because, where in
the past patent holders could rely on weaknesses in private actions, SSO
rules under this regime would be buttressed by the threat of FTC enforcement.
148. See Workshop on Tools To Prevent Patent "Hold-Up" 38-41 (June 21, 2011) [hereinafter "Hold-Up" Workshop], available at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/workshops/standards/
transcript.pdf (remarks of Earl Nied, Program Dir., Intel Corp.).
149. See Lemley , supra note 6, at 1904 (describing a survey conducted in which twentyfour of thirty-six SSOs analyzed imposed either an express or implied obligation that members
disclose intellectual property rights of which they were aware).
150. See "Hold-Up" Workshop, supra note 148, at 47-51 (remarks of Amy Marasco,
Manager, Microsoft Corp.).
151.

See id.

152. Even though SSOs are limited by antitrust laws in that they are unable to require
terms such as specific pricing, they may still address issues including patent disclosure and
reasonablenessof pricing. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
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C. Broad ConsiderationsAssociated with Enforcement by Rule
The previous Section spoke to the specific elements of the proposed rule

formulation. However, some general issues arise under a system driven by
agency enforcement by rule rather than through traditional litigation. This
Section addresses the concerns and benefits of the proposed enforcement
approach.
1. Concerns with Enforcement by Rule
One concern is that enforcement by rule is essentially untested and may

therefore be a poor outlet to rely on in situations of such profound impact as
patent holdups. Opportunities for antitrust rulemaking have been discussed
by a variety of legal scholars' 53 and FTC staff.' 54 While the FTC has promulgated one rule under its antitrust rulemaking authority, 55 the rule was

made over forty years ago and has since been repealed because it was
deemed unnecessary by FTC staff. 56 Some have questioned whether antitrust rulemaking is a practical solution to antitrust problems in light of the
many unanswered questions that exist about how courts and others will react
to FTC rules.'57
This concern is not fatal to this Note's approach. The FTC has substan-

tial experience promulgating and enforcing rules under the consumer
protection prong of Section 5.158 This suggests that the FTC should be experienced enough to translate its success under that half of Section 5 to the
"unfair methods of competition" half, and demonstrates that courts are not
unfamiliar with FTC rulemaking. Moreover, disuse of antitrust rulemaking
authority is not a major problem. Rather, it simply suggests that traditional

enforcement actions have in the past suited the needs of the FTC. As commerce evolves, however, the FTC should be able to tailor its enforcement
solutions to the demands of the rapidly developing sectors that employ

SSOs. Concerns as to a new application of the FTC's existing antitrust
rulemaking authority to these sectors should not weigh too heavily against
the use of such authority.
153. See, e.g., Daniel A. Crane, Technocracy and Antitrust, 86 TEx. L.
10 (2008) [hereinafter Crane, Technocracy].
154.

REV.

1159, 1206-

See, e.g., FTC Staff Narrows Rulemaking Possibilitiesto Three Areas, supra note

141, at A-13 (describing potential antitrust rulemaking opportunities considered by FTC staff).
155. Discriminatory Practices in Men's and Boys' Tailored Clothing Industry, 32 Fed.
Reg. 15,584 (Nov. 9, 1967) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 412) (issuing notice of a final rule).
156. Discriminatory Practices in Men's and Boys' Tailored Clothing Industry, 59 Fed.
Reg. 8527 (Feb. 23, 1994) (codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 412) (repealing the previous rule governing promotional allowances in the mens' and boys' tailored clothing industry).
157. E.g., Crane, Technocracy, supra note 153, at 1206-10 (discussing how the success
of antitrust rules turns on questions such as whether courts would view antitrust law as lending
itself to a rule-based approach).
158. Cf Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 § 40(a)(1), 12
U.S.C. § 1831t (2006) (requiring the FTC to issue a rule prescribing the manner and content
of certain disclosures and of enforcement of the rule).
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Another concern regards the political implications of the FTC invoking
its antitrust rulemaking authority. One of the benefits often cited by proponents of rulemaking is that the rulemaking process, through notice and
comment procedures, often brings important topics to Congress's attention. 159 There is, however, a corresponding risk that Congress may grow
concerned about the FTC's increasing intervention in the technology sector.
In the 1970s and 1980s, the FTC experienced backlash from Congress due
to its activism in the consumer protection arena. 160 As a result, the FTC's
authority and resources were curtailed, and procedures for promulgating
rules under the consumer protection prong of Section 5 became so burdensome that they rendered FTC-initiated consumer protection rulemaking an
impractical and rarely used tool. 61 With an approach based on the "unfair
methods of competition" prong, there may be a concern that FTC intervention in the technology sector could trigger a similar response from Congress.
This too is not fatal to the approach. The proposed rule uses a light
touch in that it only buttresses rules established by SSOs. Because the rule
would support actions by the private sector to manage their own activities
rather than introducing additional agency oversight, Congress would be unlikely to react the way it did when the FTC's activism in the consumer
protection arena evoked fears of excessive government intervention.
One final concern with the approach is that it will demand more of the
FTC in a regulatory capacity than the FTC is capable of handling. For example, under any rule where the FTC would be called upon to enforce
RAND terms, the FTC might fall into the role of license-rate regulator, determining which licensing fees are reasonable and which are unreasonable.
But the FTC is a relatively small institution with limited resources.1 62 Some
are concerned that under such a scenario the Commission would have to
the
bring on new staff with expertise in the technology sector to monitor
63
reasonableness of licensing terms arising from SSO commitments.1
This concern is unlikely to be serious under the proposed formulation.
As to the problem of determining "reasonableness," the FTC has already
developed expertise in this area and, in fact, recently authored a report putting forth workable solutions to the problem of calculating "reasonableness"
in the context of RAND commitments. 64 Further, the FTC would not need
to establish itself as a monitoring body and would not incur the related costs
159. See Hemphill, supra note 139, at 680-81.
160. Winerman, supra note 145, at 890; see also Kovacic & Winerman, supra note 85, at
943 ("In the... 1970s, Commission efforts to use Section 5 litigation to reach beyond prevailing interpretations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act elicited strong political backlash
from the Congress.").
161. See H.R. REP. No. 11-367 (2009); supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text.
162. See M. Sean Royall et al., Deterring "Patent Ambush" in Standard Setting: Lessons
from Rambus and Qualcomm, ANTITRUST, Summer 2009, at 34, 36-37.
163. See Crane, Technocracy, supra note 153, at 1205.
164. FED. TRADE COMM'N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NoTICE AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 21-25 (2011), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/

2011/03/110307patentreport.pdf.
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of increases in staff and resources. Rather, enforcement of the proposed rule
would operate similarly to the FTC's enforcement of its consumer protection rules. Under that regime, companies and individuals report fraudulent
activity that violates one of the FTC's rules, which the Commission then
investigates and, at its discretion, prosecutes. 16 Because the burden would
be on the private sector to report in such a regime, the FTC would not need
to monitor SSO activity. And as with consumer protection enforcement, a
small number of decisive enforcement actions against abusive firms should
166
act as a deterrent sufficient to decrease the FTC's litigation workload.
Thus, despite some legitimate concerns with the approach of enforcement
by rule, those concerns are not fatal to the strategy. Moreover, the next Section demonstrates that there are also general benefits to enforcement by rule
that weigh in favor of the approach.
2. Benefits of Enforcement by Rule
While there are some issues associated with choosing to combat patent
holdup by rule, the benefits of selecting a rule-based approach generally outweigh those issues. One of the greatest benefits of adopting a rule is that it
provides clear notice to industry. Section 5 is a broad provision; new cases
that rely on an expanding interpretation of it have increasingly drawn
concerns from industry, the courts, and members of the FTC. 167 The Act's

flexibility has left those in the technology sector unclear about the scope of
the statute and uncertain about whether specific patent holders' actions are
subject to FTC enforcement or whether they are permissible. Under such a
regime, manufacturers may become dissuaded from participating in SSOs
out of concern that the law might not capture critical standard-setting abuses, and patent holders might be dissuaded from participating in SSOs out of
fear of antitrust liability. But under a rule-based approach, industry has a
better idea of the boundaries of the law. This should provide patent holders
some disincentive from engaging in patent holdup and SSO members some
assurance that good faith participation in SSOs will not lead to antitrust liability.
The rulemaking process also offers SSO members an opportunity to be
involved in developing the FTC rule itself. APA procedures would require
the FTC to use a notice-and-comment system of rulemaking, whereby the
FTC must seek public comment on its proposed rule. 68 This gives SSOs and
SSO members an opportunity to comment on the rule, offering suggestions
165. FED. TRADE COMM'N, THE FTC IN 2011, at 21-50 (2011), available at http://www.
ftc.gov/os/2011/04/201 1ChairmansReport.pdf (discussing the FTC's annual activities in con-

sumer protection).
166.

See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM'N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRA-

(2002) (concluding that FTC investigations and enforcement deterred anticompetitive
pharmaceutical agreements).
167. See supra Section lI.C.
168. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006); see also FTC OPERATING MANUAL, supra note 138, § .4
(describing FTC rulemaking procedures); Croley, supra note 134, at 106-11.
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about how the rule should be framed and presenting any concerns they may
have with the FTC's formulation of it. The final rule would thus likely receive greater support from SSOs than an alternative regulation might
otherwise receive, and it may be more effective as a result of comments
submitted by industry insiders.
Another benefit of rulemaking is that it limits FTC enforcement in the
standard-setting area, allaying concerns related to the seemingly limitless
scope of Section 5. Such concerns have been raised not only by industry but
by members of the Commission as well.' 69 They are based on the fear that
FTC actions under an ever-expanding Section 5 could result in backlash
from the courts that could diminish the effectiveness of future enforcement
actions. 70 In bringing patent holdup actions under a rule, the Commission
may both alleviate this fear and initiate actions it might not otherwise bring
due to worries about judicial reaction and other collateral effects. Moreover,
by adopting an enforcement-by-rule approach, the FTC eases its burden at
trial in that it need only show that a party violated the rule to prove its prima
facie case. This simplified enforcement structure benefits industry and others concerned about expansive use of Section 5, and also benefits the FTC's
enforcement efforts against SSO abuse by reducing its burden at trial.
Finally, the FTC, as an agency with expertise in antitrust law, is more
capable of crafting a rule to remedy the patent holdup problem than the
courts would be in a system that relied on the judiciary to set the tone of
enforcement in the SSO context. 7' "Rulemaking yields higher-quality policy decisions than adjudication because it invites broad participation in the
policymaking process by all affected entities and groups, and because it encourages the agency to focus on the broad effects of its policy rather than
' In crafting
the often idiosyncratic adjudicative facts of a specific dispute."172
a rule with the force of law, the FTC directly addresses the patent holdup
problem in the context of a broader antitrust policy agenda. Relying on the
courts to develop the law through precedent is an inexact method that may
not provide a complete solution to the problems at hand. Courts generally
have little antitrust expertise and thus may not be suitable outlets for setting
effective antitrust policy. 17 3 The FTC, by contrast, is an agency of antitrust
experts with decades of experience in the field. Its staff is acutely aware of
the antitrust considerations at play in the standard-setting context and capable of promulgating a rule that speaks directly to those considerations while
169. See, e.g., Negotiated Data Complaint, supra note 84, at *22-23 (Kovacic, Comm'r,
dissenting).
170. See supra Section II.C.
171. See Hemphill, supra note 139, at 673-74.
172. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Two Problems in AdministrativeLaw: PoliticalPolarityon the
District of Columbia Circuit and JudicialDeterrence of Agency Rulemaking, 1988 DUKE L.J.

300, 308.
173. See, e.g., Michael R. Baye & Joshua D. Wright, Is Antitrust Too Complicatedfor
GeneralistJudges? The Impact of Economic Complexity and Judicial Training on Appeals, 54
J.L. & ECON. 1 (2011) (concluding that antitrust cases are too complicated for generalist judg-

es).
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minimizing any negative collateral effects.174 The problem of patent holdup
is more likely to be remedied by vesting policymaking in the FTC through
the rulemaking process than by relying solely on the courts.
CONCLUSION

With the increasingly important role technology plays in our lives, it is
important that the law continue to foster an environment in which technological innovation can flourish. The adoption of the standard-setting
mechanism by the technology sector seems to have outpaced the law: current legal protections have proven insufficient to prevent the abusive practice
of patent holdup that appears in SSOs. Where patent holders are able to
abuse the standard-setting process to the detriment of others in the industry,
it not only harms consumers by driving prices higher but also threatens to
inhibit technological advancement.
While looking to enforcement actions under Section 5 of the FTCA may
appear to be an attractive alternative to more traditional reliance on contract
law or the Sherman Act, it remains an incomplete solution. Instead of relying on an overly broad FTCA or an overly narrow Sherman Act, consumers
and industry would be better served through the FTC rulemaking process. A
rule that makes violations of SSO bylaws unlawful unfair methods of competition under the FTCA would carry the benefits of Section 5 without many
of the drawbacks that litigation under that statute brings. The rule proposed
in this Note would provide notice to industry and assurance to the courts
regarding the bounds of FTC action, while remaining flexible enough to
capture patent holders who might otherwise find a way to circumvent the
law. Though not without its own difficulties, it is clear that a rule-based solution is well suited to remedy the current deficiencies in the law, and can
thereby promote innovation and growth in the technology sector that will
benefit both industry and consumers.

174. See Crane, Technocracy, supra note 153, at 1159-65, 1197-202 (describing the
development of the FTC into an agency of antitrust experts and arguing that such expertise
justifies expanding the FTC's norm-creation authority in antitrust); Pierce, Jr., supra note 172,
at 308 (speaking to the preference to defer to administrative agencies and the rulemaking
process to take advantage of the expertise of agency staff).
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